Comments: Whose Baby Is It Anyway? The Current and Future Status of Surrogacy Contracts in Maryland by Bashur, Ashley E.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 1 Fall 2008 Article 10
2008
Comments: Whose Baby Is It Anyway? The
Current and Future Status of Surrogacy Contracts
in Maryland
Ashley E. Bashur
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bashur, Ashley E. (2008) "Comments: Whose Baby Is It Anyway? The Current and Future Status of Surrogacy Contracts in
Maryland," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 38: Iss. 1, Article 10.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol38/iss1/10
WHOSE BABY IS IT ANYWAY? THE CURRENT AND 
FUTURE STATUS OF SURROGACY CONTRACTS IN 
MARYLAND 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"What had not been fathomed exists today." 1 The use of assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART) has become increasingly prevalent 
in the last fifty years, 2 although artificial insemination was used as 
early as 1 799. 3 As of 2002, approximately 8% of women of 
childbearing age in the United States had made an infertility-related 
medical visit at some point in the past.4 Recently, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland had the opportunity to decide a case of first 
impression regarding the ability of a gestational surrogate and the 
intended father of the babies to remove the surrogate's name from the 
babies' birth certificates. 5 While the court's decision was not 
strongly contested because both the intended father and the surrogate 
wanted the surrogate's name removed from the birth certificate, the 
court's decision has both opened the door to the upholding of 
surrogacy contracts and also left many unanswered questions about 
the current state of surrogacy contracts in Maryland. 
The objective of this Comment is not to discuss whether surrogacy 
arrangements should be allowed in Maryland. Although the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has not expressly ruled on this issue, dicta in In 
re Roberto d.B. suggests that the court will uphold surrogacy 
contracts where a woman is merely acting as a gestational carrier and 
is not biologically related to the child she has contracted to carry to 
term. 6 The main goal of this Comment is to delve into a more narrow 
issue: In Maryland, when surrogacy arrangements "go bad" and the 
surrogate wants to keep the baby, what should the outcome be? 
I. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 279, 923 A.2d 115, 122 (2007). 
2. CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 60 ( 1989). 
3. !d. at 59. An English surgeon, Dr. John Hunter, is credited with performing the first 
artificial insemination in a human being after others had previously experimented on 
animals. !d. 
4. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology: 
Home, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/index.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2008). 
5. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 270, 923 A.2d at 117. 
6. !d. The court does not similarly discuss traditional surrogacy arrangements where the 
egg donor is also the gestational carrier of the child. !d. 
165 
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Because the decision to uphold or not uphold a surrogacy contract in 
this situation leads to the placement of a child, it is important to 
acknowledge not only legal contract principles, but also public policy 
implications. These implications can include the psychological 
effects on the surrogate mother and the intended parents; the potential 
medical, social, and psychological impact on the children; and 
general values of the population with regard to whose interests are 
the strongest. All of these complicated factors must be taken into 
consideration before a decision can be made on the issue. 
Additionally, existing laws on adoption may be applicable. 7 This 
Comment attempts to examine and analyze these factors using real 
examples of surrogacy arrangements, other states' approaches, and 
statistical data in order to answer this troublesome and perhaps 
unanswerable question. 
Part II.A of this Comment discusses the background and different 
types of surrogacy arrangements, particularly noting the difference 
between traditional and gestational surrogacy. Part II.B examines 
various approaches taken by other states with regard to surrogacy 
contracts. Part III looks at Maryland's history, both legislative and 
judicial, regarding surrogacy decisions and laws. Part IV analyzes 
the court of appeals' decision in In re Roberto d.B. and how it affects 
and will affect current and future surrogacy laws. Part V discusses 
the public policy implications discussed above. Finally, Part VI 
analyzes the ultimate question of whether a surrogacy contract should 
be upheld when the surrogate wants to keep the baby, particularly 
noting the difference between traditional and gestational surrogacy 
arrangements. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Assisted Reproductive Technology and Surrogacy and 
Types of Surrogacy Arrangements 
The term assisted reproductive technology (ART) means "all 
treatments or procedures which include the handling of human 
oocytes or embryos, including in vitro fertilization, gamete 
intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer, and such other 
specific technologies .... " 8 The procedure commonly known as 
"artificial insemination" was the first form of ART used. 9 Artificial 
7. !d. at 293-94, 923 A.2d at 130-31. 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7 (2000). 
9. CHARLES P. KlNDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 29 (2006). 
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insemination is the "[i]nsertion of sperm into female reproductive 
organs by any means other than sexual intercourse with the intent to 
cause a pregnancy." 10 The first documented use of artificial 
insemination in a human in the United States took place in 1866. 11 
Historically, surrogacy was first defined as a type of assisted 
artificial insemination, where a married or single woman would be 
injected with the sperm of a married man who was not her husband, 
and she would bear a child for the couple. 12 This is now called 
"traditional surrogacy." 13 More commonly used today is gestational 
surrogacy, which "involves using a woman who agrees to carry a 
child for intended parents (who may or may not also be the genetic 
parent or parents), conceived by the gametes of others, with a result 
that she gives birth to a child with whom she has no genetic 
connection." 14 These types of surrogates are usually used "when the 
woman of a married couple has viable eggs but cannot carry a child 
to term." 15 This allows an infertile couple to have children to whom 
they are genetically related. 16 The first reported baby born using 
gestational surrogacy was in January 1984. 17 
It is important to distinguish between these two types of surrogacy. 
In a traditional surrogacy arrangement, the woman who carries the 
baby to term (the surrogate) is the biological mother of the child, 
while in a gestational surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate is not the 
biological mother18 and thus has less of a right to the child. 
There are many variations on gestational surrogacy. In one form, 
"a woman's ova are retrieved and fertilized in vitro with the sperm of 
her husband or partner" and "any resulting embryos are transferred to 
the uterus of another woman for gestation." 19 In another variation, 
egg donation is used, "producing the embryo for the intended parents 
using the sperm of the intended father and donated ova," and "any 
resulting embryos are transferred into a gestational surrogate for 
10. /d. at 323. 
11. Johnson v. Super. Ct., 101 Cal. App. 4th 869, 881 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Karen M. 
Ginsberg, Note, FDA Approved? A Critique of the Artificial Insemination Industry in 
the United States, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 823, 826 (1997)). 
12. KlNDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 129. 
13. !d. 
14. !d. at 132. 
15. !d. at 133. 
16. !d. 
17. MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES 36 
(1990). 
18. KlNDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 9, at 132. 
19. /d. at 132-33. 
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implantation and gestation."20 A third variation uses both egg 
donation and sperm donation, "in which the embryos are entirely 
created from donor gametes" and then transferred into a gestational 
surrogate who bears the children for the intended parents. 21 This last 
situation is the most complicated with the greatest likelihood of 
competing interests among the various parties involved, such as the 
surrogate and her possible husband; the intended parents who have no 
genetic or legally presumptive relationship to the child; the egg donor 
and her potential husband; and the sperm donor and his potential 
wife. 22 Surrogacy arrangements can lead to a child having too many 
parents, as in the scenario above, but other surrogacy arrangements 
can lead to a child having just one parent, as Judge Cathell points out 
in his dissenting opinion in In re Roberto d. B.: "At the end of this 
manufacturing process, the result is a child who, according to the 
majority, is to have no mother at birth."23 
B. Overview of Various States' Standards for Surrogacy Contracts 
1. California 
California holds the distinction of being the state with the most 
surrogacy cases. 24 In addition, California was the first state to 
determine the outcome of surrogacy cases by focusing on intention, 
rather than on biology or gestation alone. 25 In Johnson v. Calvert, 26 
the court ruled that the intended parents, who were also the genetic 
parents, were the legal parents of a child who was carried by a 
gestational surrogate. 27 The court stated that gestation and genetics 
were each a sufficient basis for parenthood, but that a child could 
only have one natural mother.28 The court held that when there is no 
one woman who is both the genetic and birth mother of the child, 
20. !d. at 133. 
21. !d. 
22. See generally id. 
23. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 296, 923 A.2d 115, 132 (2007) (Cathell, J., 
dissenting). 
24. KlNDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 9, at 149. 
25. !d. 
26. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
27. !d. 
28. Id. ("Yet for any child California law recognizes only one natural mother, despite 
advances in reproductive technology rendering a different outcome biologically 
possible."). 
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then the legal mother is the woman who intended to cause the birth 
and raise the child as her own. 29 
California's "intended parent test" has been not only used by other 
courts, 30 but also analyzed extensively in many law review articles 
and books around the country. 31 State courts have trended "towards 
honoring the intent of the parties" at the time that they entered into 
the surrogacy arrangement to decide the controversy. 32 
However, after Johnson, in In re Marriage of Moschetta, 33 the 
California high court declined to enforce a surrogacy agreement 
made between the intended parents and a surrogate because it was a 
traditional surrogacy arrangement, not gestational. 34 The court said 
that "enforcement of a traditional surrogacy contract by itself is 
incompatible with the parentage and adoption statutes already on the 
books."35 The court also likened traditional surrogacy to adoption, 
stating, 
In traditional surrogacy the so-called "surrogate" mother is 
not only the woman who gave birth to the child, but the 
child's genetic mother as well. She is, without doubt, the 
"natural" parent of the child, as is the father. This fact is 
critical if the "surrogate" changes her mind before she 
formally consents to an adoption. In such a case, only the 
29. !d. 
30. See, e.g., In reMarriage ofMoschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994). 
31. See generally Jeffrey M. Place, Gestational Surrogacy and the Meaning of "Mother": 
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 907 (1994) 
(concluding that a test based on genetic parentage is preferable to the "intended 
parent" test); Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between 
Genetics, Procreative Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 
15 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 379 (2007); Flavia Berys, Comment, 
Interpreting a Rent-a-Womb Contract: How California Courts Should Proceed When 
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements Go Sour, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 321 (2006). 
32. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 9, at 145. 
33. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893. 
34. !d. at 894-95. 
35. !d. The Court distinguished this case from Johnson v. Calvert because in Johnson, 
both the surrogate and the biological mother had equal claims to the child under the 
Uniform Parentage Act, but the biological mother prevailed because she was the 
intended parent. See 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993). In Moschetta, both women did 
not have equal claims to the child because the traditional surrogate was also the 
biological mother of the child, so there was no need to use the intent test. 30 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 896. 
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initial agreement itself can arguably defeat her claim to 
parenthood. 36 
Since there was no formal consent to an adoption in this case, the 
court was forced to look solely at the surrogacy contract, which it 
refused to enforce because of its incompatibility with the parentage 
and adoption statutes. 37 
California reaffirmed its use of the "intent" test in In reMarriage 
of Buzzanca. 38 In this case, a husband and wife agreed to have an 
embryo genetically unrelated to either of them implanted into a 
woman, a gestational surrogate also unrelated to the embryo, who 
would carry and give birth to the resulting child. 39 After the 
surrogate became pregnant, the husband and wife filed for divorce. 40 
The question of who baby Jaycee's legal parents were came to the 
court because the husband wanted to avoid paying child support. 41 
The father wanted to avoid responsibility to the child, and the trial 
court, in an extraordinary decision, ruled that Jaycee had no legal 
parents because the only people biologically related to her were the 
sperm and egg donors. 42 The appellate court reversed, stating, 
"Jaycee never would have been born had not Luanne and John both 
agreed to have a fertilized egg implanted in a surrogate. " 43 The court 
used the body of law holding that parenthood could be established 
based on conduct separate from giving birth or being biologically 
related to the child. 44 The California appellate court ultimately held 
that "a husband and wife [should] be deemed the lawful parents of a 
child after a surrogate bears a biologically unrelated child on their 
behalf."45 The husband and wife are legally responsible as parents 
because the procreation of the child resulted from "a medical 
procedure [that] was initiated and consented to by intended 
parents."46 
36. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894. 
37. !d. 
38. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 292 (Ct. App. 1998). 







46. !d. The court stated further, 
Even though neither Luanne nor John are biologically related to 
Jaycee, they are still her lawful parents given their initiating role 
as the intended parents in her conception and birth. . . . Indeed, in 
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2. Massachusetts 
Massachusetts also has a substantial number of surrogacy 
decisions. 47 In R.R. v. MH., 48 a married couple entered into a 
traditional surrogacy agreement with a woman who agreed to be 
inseminated with the sperm of the intended father. 49 Although the 
contract provided that the surrogate would surrender custody of the 
child to the intended parents upon its birth, during the pregnancy, the 
surrogate informed the intended parents that she had changed her 
mind and wanted to keep the child. 50 In holding that this traditional 
surrogacy agreement was unenforceable, the Massachusetts court 
ruled that, because the child was the genetic child of the surrogate, 
the policies behind adoption statutes should be used as guidance in 
determining the validity of the agreement. 51 In Massachusetts, an 
adoption requires the written consent of the mother and father. 52 
However, consent of the mother cannot be given until four days after 
the birth of the baby. 53 Although the court held this particular 
surrogacy contract unenforceable, it also said in dicta: 
If no compensation is paid beyond pregnancy-related 
expenses and if the mother is not bound by her consent to 
the father's custody of the child unless she consents after a 
suitable period has passed following the child's birth, the 
objections we have identified in this opinion to the 
enforceability of a surrogate's consent to custody would be 
overcome. 54 
both the most famous child custody case of all time, and in our 
Supreme Court's Johnson v. Calvert decision, the court looked to 
intent to parent as the ultimate basis of its decision. Fortunately, 
as the Johnson court also noted, intent to parent 'correlate[s] 
significantly' with a child's best interests. 
!d. at 293. 
47. KlNDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 159. 
48. 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998). 
49. !d. at 792. 
50. !d. at 793. The intended parents agreed to compensate the surrogate for her services, 
in the amount of$10,000, which was an express provision of the contract. Id. at 792. 
51. !d. at 796. 
52. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 2 (West 2005). 
53. !d. 
54. R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 797. The court also articulated several factors which would 
alleviate its concerns with regard to enforcing a traditional surrogacy arrangement: (1) 
that the surrogate have time after the child's birth to decide whether to surrender the 
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One year later, in Smith v. Brown, 55 the Massachusetts court 
established a protocol that would allow parties to a gestational 
surrogacy arrangement to seek a judgment of maternity and 
paternity. 56 
3. New Jersey 
New Jersey is home to one of the first and most famous surrogacy 
cases, In re Baby M. 57 In this controversial case, a married couple, 
the Stems, made an agreement with a married woman, Mrs. 
Whitehead, to have Mr. Stem's sperm artificially inseminated into 
Mrs. Whitehead, so the Stems could have a child that was 
biologically related to Mr. Stem. 58 When baby Melissa was born, 
Mrs. Whitehead realized that she was unable to part with the child. 59 
Despite her feelings, Mrs. Whitehead gave baby Melissa to the Stems 
pursuant to the contract. 60 Later that night, "Mrs. Whitehead became 
deeply disturbed, disconsolate, [and] stricken with unbearable 
sadness."61 Afraid that Mrs. Whitehead might commit suicide, the 
Stems gave the baby to her, and Mrs. Whitehead took her and 
escaped to Florida, where she was not found until four months later 
when the baby was forcibly taken from her. 62 The court ultimately 
found that the surrogacy contract was unenforceable because the 
compensation given to Mrs. Whitehead and her financial need made 
the contract seem involuntary, and because the surrogate did not have 
the ability to change her mind and assert her parental rights. 63 
However, because Mr. Stem was the biological father of the baby, 
and because of the greater stability of the Stems, as compared with 
child for adoption; (2) that the surrogate's husband consent; (3) that all parties be 
evaluated for their soundness in judgment and capacity; (4) that the intended mother 
not be able to safely bear a child herself; (5) that the intended parents be suitable 
parents; (6) that all parties have legal representation. /d. 
55. 718 N.E.2d 844 (Mass. 1999). 
56. /d. at 846. 
57. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), superseded by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-15.l(a) 
(West 2007); see also KlNDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 167 n.l63. 
58. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235. Mrs. Whitehead was to be paid $10,000 for her 
services. /d. 
59. /d. at 1236. Mrs. Whitehead also claimed to feel a bond with the child even during 
the pregnancy. !d. 
60. /d. 
61. /d. 
62. /d. at 1237. When Mrs. Whitehead originally went to the Stems, she told them that 
she had to have the child, even just for one week. /d. 
63. /d. at 1264. Additionally, the court believed it was within the legislature's power, and 
not the court's, to make laws regarding these types of surrogacy arrangements. /d. 
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the Whiteheads, the court made a custody determination using the 
best interests of the child standard and decided to give custody of the 
baby to Mr. Stem. 64 
lnA.H.W v. G.H.B., 65 a New Jersey trial court held that the genetic 
parents of an unborn child being carried by a gestational surrogate 
were not entitled to have their names on the child's birth certificate 
immediately after its birth because under New Jersey's adoption law, 
a mother cannot voluntarily surrender her parental rights until 
seventy-two hours after the baby's birth. 66 However, New Jersey law 
also provides for a five-day period after the birth to issue and file the 
birth certificate. 67 Therefore, the court decided that after the seventy-
two-hour period from the baby's birth, which is before the end of the 
five-day limitation on filing the birth certificate, the surrogate could 
surrender her parental rights, and the birth certificate could be filed 
with the intended parents' names on it. 68 
4. NewYork 
New York has a somewhat contradictory set of laws on 
surrogacy. 69 Although it has a statute expressly stating that surrogacy 
contracts are void and unenforceable, 70 trial courts will on occasion 
enforce them anyway. 71 
In Andres A. v. Judith N, 72 a New York court dismissed a genetic 
mother's petition for a declaration of maternity. 73 A couple had used 
their gametes to create embryos that were then implanted in a 
gestational surrogate. 74 Upon the children's birth, the intended and 
biological parents sought to establish their legal parentage. 75 The 
court dismissed the mother's petition for declaration of maternity 
64. !d. at 1260-61. 
65. 772 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
66. !d. at 954; see also N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 9:3-41(e) (West 2007). 
67. § 26:8-28(a). 
68. A.H. W., 772 A.2d at 954. 
69. See KlNDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 9, at 170. 
70. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 1999) ("Surrogate parenting contracts are 
hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void and 
unenforceable."). 
71. See KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 171 (citing McDonald v. McDonald, 
608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994)); see also, e.g., In re Doe, 793 N.Y.S.2d 878 
(Sur. Ct. 2005). 
72. 591 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Fam. Ct. 1992). 
73. !d. at 950. 
74. !d. at 947-48. 
75. !d. at 947. 
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because there was no statutory authority permitting the court to grant 
the requested relief. 76 The court noted that the intended mother could 
seek to adopt the children, and therefore, was not without remedy. 77 
In McDonald v. McDonald, 78 a New York appellate court used the 
Johnson v. Calvert "intent" test to determine the children's natural 
mother. 79 In McDonald, the wife gave birth to twin daughters who 
were conceived from the sperm of her husband and the eggs of a 
female donor. 80 In divorce proceedings, the husband argued that 
since he was the only biological parent, he should have sole 
custody. 81 The court held that "in the instant 'egg donation' case, the 
wife, who is the gestational mother, is the natural mother of the 
children, and is, under the circumstances, entitled to temporary 
custody of the children with visitation to the husband."82 
III. MARYLAND'S APPROACHES TO SURROGACY 
CONTRACTS IN THE COURTS AND LEGISLATURE 
BEFORE IN RE ROBERTO D.B. 
In order to have a complete understanding of the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland's decision in In re Roberto d.B. and to analyze the future 
of surrogacy arrangements in Maryland, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the history of surrogacy laws in this state. 
A. Legislative and Executive Authority 
After In re Baby M was decided in 1988, the Maryland legislature 
attempted to pass several laws on surrogacy. 83 The first bill, Senate 
76. !d. at 950. The court stated, "The Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and 
must adhere to its statutorily enunciated powers. . . . The statute makes no provision 
for declarations of maternity." !d. at 949. 
77. !d. at 950. 
78. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994). 
79. Id. at 479-80. 
80. Id. at 478. 
81. Id. at 478-79. 
82. !d. at 480. The court cited extensively to Johnson v. Calvert, specifically stating that 
the test formulated in that decision applied to the instant case: "Thus, under our 
analysis, in a true 'egg donation' situation, where a woman gestates and gives birth to 
a child formed from the egg of another woman with the intent to raise the child as her 
own, the birth mother is the natural mother under California law." !d. (quoting 
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,782 (Cal. 1993)). 
83. Abby Brandel, Legislating Surrogacy: A Partial Answer to Feminist Criticism, 54 
Mo. L. REv. 488,511 (1995). 
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Bill 795, would have banned surrogacy arrangements completely. 84 
The bill was passed by the Senate but was defeated in the House 
Judiciary Committee. 85 During the 1988 session, the General 
Assembly considered House Bill 649, which would have established 
minimal protection for parties involved in surrogacy agreements and 
would have required that certain terms be included in the contract for 
it to be enforceable. 86 However, this regulation attempt was also 
defeated in the House Judiciary Committee. 87 
In 1992, the Maryland General Assembly passed a complete ban on 
surrogacy contracts. 88 However, then-Governor Schaefer vetoed the 
bill, explaining that the Maryland Attorney General's Office advised 
him that a Maryland state court would most likely hold a surrogate 
contract invalid based on Maryland's prohibition on baby-selling. 89 
In addition, Governor Schaefer noted that public opinion in Maryland 
was deeply divided on surrogacy. His veto was also based on his 
personal view that "[t]he creation of a family is a personal 
decision ... best left to the individuals involved."90 In 1993, another 
bill banning surrogacy was introduced by Senator Norman Stone Jr. 91 
This bill passed in the Senate but was rejected by the House and 
received unfavorable treatment by the House Judiciary Committee.92 
Stone's bill was the final attempt to pass legislation on surrogacy. 
84. !d. at 511 n.l91. The bill would have subjected violators to "a fine not exceeding 
$10,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both." S.B. 795, 1988 Leg., 
394th Sess. (Md. 1988). 
85. Brandel, supra note 83, at 511 n.l91. 
86. H.B. 649, 1988 Leg., 394th Sess. (Md. 1988); see also Brandel, supra note 83, at 511-
12. 
87. Brandel, supra note 83, at 512. 
88. S.B. 251, 1992 Leg., 404th Sess. (Md. 1992); see also Brandel, supra note 83, at 512. 
The bill stated that "[a] surrogate parentage contract is void and unenforceable as 
against state policy." S.B. 251, 1992 Leg., 404th Sess. (Md. 1992). 
89. Letter from W. Donald Schaefer, Governor of Md., to Thomas V. "Mike" Miller, Jr., 
President of the Senate (May 26, 1992) (outlining his rationale for vetoing Senate Bill 
251); see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW§ 5-362(a) (LexisNexis 2006) ("Except as 
otherwise provided by law, a person may not charge or receive, from or for a parent or 
prospective adoptive parent, any compensation for a service in connection with: (1) 
placement of an individual to live with a preadoptive parent, as defined in § 3-
823(i)(l) of the Courts Article; or (2) an agreement for custody in contemplation of 
adoption."). 
90. Letter from W. Donald Schaefer, Governor of Md., to Thomas V. "Mike" Miller, Jr., 
President of the Senate, supra note 89. 
91. Barry F. Rosen & Lynn S. Slawson, Surrogacy Contracts in Transition, Mo. B.J., 
July/ Aug. 1993, at 32, 35 (citing S.B. 369, 1993 Leg., 407th Sess. (Md. 1993)). 
92. !d. 
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B. Surrogacy in the Courts 
Prior to In re Roberto d. B., the Maryland judicial system addressed 
the topic of surrogacy only twice, both times in circuit courts. 93 In Ex 
Parte Petition for the Adoption of a Minor Child, Howard County 
Master Bernard Raum ruled that a surrogacy contract that provided 
for compensation to the surrogate mother was void and 
unenforceable, in violation of the baby-selling statute. 94 The court 
did not make a determination as to whether surrogate adoptions were 
also in violation of Maryland public policy. 95 Rather, the court noted 
that "the public policy on the general subject of surrogacy contracts 
was in a 'state of turmoil,' and was best left to the Legislature."96 
In 1993, in Ex Parte M.S.M. and G.M. for Adoption of an Infant 
Minor, Judge Peter J. Messitte for the Circuit Court of Montgomery 
County stated that surrogacy contracts do not violate Maryland's 
baby-selling statute because it would be almost impossible to prove 
that the parties to a surrogacy contract had the required criminal 
intent. 97 Contrary to the earlier Howard County Circuit Court 
decision, Judge Messitte expressed doubt that "a court in an adoption 
proceeding could fairly conclude that surrogacy parenting contracts 
otherwise violate Maryland's public policy."98 
In an article authored by Abby Brandel in 1995, entitled 
"Legislating Surrogacy: A Partial Answer to Feminist Criticism,"99 
Ms. Brandel stated, "[i]n light of Maryland's experience with 
surrogacy, it seems likely that the General Assembly will take 
decisive action in the near future." 100 Despite Ms. Brandel's 
prediction of quick legislative action on surrogacy arrangements, the 
Maryland General Assembly has not taken further action. As a 
result, the legality of surrogacy in Maryland remained in question 
until the In re Roberto d.B. decision, with the exception of the 
general prohibition on baby-selling. 101 Up until In re Roberto d.B., 
93. Brandel, supra note 83, at 513. 
94. 85 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 348 (2000) (summarizing Ex Parte Petition for the Adoption 
of a Minor Child, No. 91-AD-1681). 
95. !d. 
96. !d. 
97. 85 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 348 (2000) (discussing Ex Parte M.S.M. and G.M. for 
Adoption of an Infant Minor, No. 11171 ). 
98. !d. 
99. Brandel, supra note 83. 
100. !d. at 514-15. 
101. See Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW§ 5-362(a)(LexisNexis 2006); Mo. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW § 3-603 (LexisNexis 2002) ("A person may not sell, barter, or trade, or offer to 
sell, barter, or trade, a minor for money, property, or anything else of value .... (b) A 
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no Maryland appellate court had decided any case relating to 
surrogacy, thus In re Roberto d.B. was a matter of first impression in 
Maryland. 102 
IV. IN RE ROBERTO D.B. AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
SURROGACY IN MARYLAND 
A. Facts 
An unmarried male, Appellant Roberto d.B. (Roberto), utilized in 
vitro fertilization, in which his sperm was used to fertilize eggs from 
an egg donor, which resulted in two fertilized eggs. 103 He contracted 
with a woman, the putative appellee in the case, 104 to be the 
gestational surrogate and have the fertilized eggs implanted into her, 
so she could carry and give birth to any resulting children. 105 The 
fertilized eggs were implanted into the surrogate on December 21, 
2000, and she delivered twins, with whom she had no biological 
connection, on August 23, 2001, at Holy Cross Hospital in Silver 
Spring. 106 
According to the Maryland Health Code, the medical records 
department of a hospital is obliged to submit information regarding 
births to the Maryland Division of Vital Records (MDVR). 107 When 
person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is 
subject to imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or a fine not exceeding $10,000 or both 
for each violation."). 
102. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267,270,923 A.2d 115, 117 (2007) ("The law is being 
tested as these new techniques become more commonplace and accepted; this case 
represents the first challenge in Maryland."). 
103. !d. at 271, 923 A.2d at 117. 
104. The gestational surrogate is the "putative appellee" because she joined the appellant's 
petition requesting the court to issue an accurate birth certificate-one that did not 
reference her as the children's mother;· thus, her position was not adverse to the 
appellant's. !d. at 273, 923 A.2d at 118-19. 
105. /d. at 271, 923 A.2d at 117. 
106. !d. at 271,273,923 A.2d at 117-18. 
107. /d. at 271, 923 A.2d at 117; MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-208(a)(4)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2007). Section 208(a) of the Health-General article 
provides: 
(1) Within 72 hours after a birth occurs in an institution, or en 
route to the institution, the administrative head of the institution or 
a designee of the administrative head shall: (i) Prepare, on the 
form that the Secretary provides, a certificate of birth; (ii) Secure 
each signature that is required on the certificate; and (iii) File the 
certificate. (2) The attending physician shall provide the date of 
birth and medical information that are required on the certificate 
178 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 38 
the MDVR receives this information from the hospital, it issues the 
birth certificate. 108 "Unless a court order otherwise provides, the 
hospital will report the gestational carrier as the 'mother' of the child 
to the MDVR." 109 
Holy Cross Hospital followed this procedure, and the MDVR 
issued birth certificates listing the gestational surrogate as the mother 
of the children. 110 However, neither the father nor the gestational 
within 72 hours after the birth. (3) The results of the universal 
hearing screening of newborns shall be incorporated into the 
supplemental information required by the Department to be 
submitted as a part of the birth event. ( 4) Upon the birth of a child 
to an unmarried woman in an institution, the administrative head 
of the institution or the designee of the administrative head shall: 
(i) Provide an opportunity for the child's mother and the father to 
complete a standardized affidavit of parentage recognizing 
parentage of the child on the standardized form provided by the 
Department of Human Resources under § 5-1028 of the Family 
Law Article; (ii) Furnish to the mother written information 
prepared by the Child Support Enforcement Administration 
concerning the benefits of having the paternity of her child 
established, including the availability of child support 
enforcement services; and (iii) Forward the completed affidavit to 
the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Division of Vital 
Records. The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Division 
of Vital Records shall make the affidavits available to the parents, 
guardian of the child, or a child support enforcement agency upon 
request. (5) An institution, the administrative head of the 
institution, the designee of the administrative head of an 
institution, and an employee of an institution may not be held 
liable in any cause of action arising out of the establishment of 
paternity. (6) If the child's mother was not married at the time of 
either conception or birth or between conception and birth, the 
name of the father may not be entered on the certificate without an 
affidavit of paternity as authorized by§ 5-1028 of the Family Law 
Article signed by the mother and the person to be named on the 
certificate as the father. (7) In any case in which paternity of a 
child is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the name 
of the father and surname of the child shall be entered on the 
certificate of birth in accordance with the finding and order of the 
court. (8) If the father is not named on the certificate of birth, no 
other information about the father shall be entered on the 
certificate. 
108. Mo. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-208(b),(e); see, e.g., In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 
at 271-72, 923 A.2d at 118. 
109. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md .. at 272, 923 A.2d at 118. See also Mo. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN.§ 4-208. 
110. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 272, 923 A.2d at 118. 
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surrogate wanted her name to be on the birth certificates. 111 The 
surrogate had no expectation or intention of being a "mother" to the 
twins to whom she gave birth. 112 Thus, the surrogate joined the 
father's petition asking that the surrogate's name be removed from 
the twins' birth certificates and that Roberto be declared the father. 113 
B. The Circuit Court's Decision and Rationale 
The Circuit Court for Montgomery County rejected the appellant's 
petition to have the surrogate's name removed from the children's 
birth certificates. 114 The court gave two reasons for refusing the 
petition. 115 First, "no Maryland case law exists that would give a trial 
court the power to remove the mother's name from a birth 
certificate.""6 Second, "removing the name of the surrogate from the 
birth certificate is inconsistent with the 'best interests of the child' 
standard ('BI C') [sic], citing, generally, 'health reasons."' 117 The 
circuit court expressed the opinion that even if the gestational 
surrogate were to give up her parental rights, her name should remain 
on the birth certificates for health reasons. 118 The court also indicated 
that "[t]his is not an appropriate issue for adoption," without 
providing any rationale for this statement. 119 
The circuit court's best interests of the child reasoning stemmed 
from its belief that "[ t ]here are a lot of public policy reasons why it is 
not in the best interests of the child not to have the mother's name on 
the birth certificate," 120 and "[t]here are health reasons why you 
might want to have, and it would be good to have the mother's name 
on the birth certificate, and have that information available." 121 
As discussed in the following section, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland did not find the circuit court's reasoning persuasive, and 
reversed its decision. 122 
111. /d. at 272, 923 A.2d at 118. 
112. !d. at 273, 923 A.2d at 118. 
113. !d. at 273, 923 A.2d at 118-19. 
114. !d. at 273, 923 A.2d at 119. 
115. !d. at 274, 923 A.2d at 119. 
116. !d. 
117. !d. 
118. !d. at 274 n.4, 923 A.2d at 119 n.4. 
119. !d. 
120. !d. at 285, 923 A.2d at 126. 
121. !d. 
122. !d. at 295, 923 A.2d at 132. 
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C. The Court of Appeals' Decision and Rationale 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland rendered three holdings: (1) 
under the Equal Rights Amendment, the paternity statutes apply 
equally to both men and women, and therefore the process by which 
men can challenge paternity can also be used by women to challenge 
maternity; 123 (2) the best interests of the child standard did not 
apply; 124 and (3) the surrogate was not required to be listed on the 
children's birth certificates. 125 
1. The Equal Protection Analysis 
Roberto argued that because Maryland's parentage statutes allow 
men to deny paternity, but not women to deny maternity, the statutes 
violated the Equal Rights Amendment. 126 The court first examined 
the paternity statutes 127 and determined that "Maryland law currently 
accommodates . . . a birth certificate on which the mother is not 
identified." 128 Specifically, the court noted that Section 4-211 of the 
Health-General Article provides: 
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the 
Secretary shall make a new certificate of birth for an 
individual if the Department receives satisfactory proof. 
that: ... (2) Regardless of the location, one of the following 
has occurred: ... (ii) A court of competent jurisdiction has 
entered an order as to the parentage, legitimation, or 
adoption of the individual. 129 
The court reasoned that because the statute contained a neutral 
word-"parentage"-the statute "does not preclude the courts from 
issuing an order authorizing a birth certificate that does not list the 
mother's name." 130 
The court also noted that it has held in the past that "a statute will 
be construed to avoid a conflict with the Constitution" whenever 
123. !d. at 282-84, 923 A.2d at 124-25. 
124. !d. at 285, 923 A.2d at 126. 
125. !d. 
126. !d. at 275, 923 A.2d at 120. 
127. !d. at 275-78, 923 A.2d at 120-22. See generally MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-
1001 to 5-1048 (West 2006). 
128. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 278,923 A.2d at 121. 
129. !d. at 278, 923 A.2d at 121-22 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.§ 4-211(a) 
(West 2006) (emphasis added)). 
130. !d. at 278, 923 A.2d at 122; see also§ 4-211(a)(2)(ii). 
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possible. 131 Therefore, the court held that the language of the 
paternity statutes did not need to be rewritten; the court needed only 
to interpret the statutes to give the same rights to women challenging 
maternity as were already given to men challenging paternity. 132 
2. The Best Interests of the Child Standard Analysis 
The court held that the best interests of the child standard did not 
apply in this case. 133 The court stated that in general, courts will use 
the best interests of the child standard when there is a disagreement 
between two parents or a parent and a third party concerning custody 
of the child. 134 Additionally, when there is a dispute between a 
parent and a non-parent, the best interests of the child standard is not 
utilized unless the parent is first found to be unfit. 135 In this case, a 
third party wanted to relinquish her parental rights, rather than assert 
them; as a result, the issue of custody was not disputed. Also, there 
was no issue of the father being unfit. 136 Therefore, the court 
determined that the best interests of the child standard was 
inappropriate for the trial court to use and did not apply in this 
case. 137 
3. Authorization of the Court to Remove Surrogate's Name from 
Birth Certificates 
The court noted that the MDVR had no objection to the removal of 
the surrogate's name from the birth certificates in response to a court 
order. 138 
If a biological parent is unmarried, and is the only intended 
parent (usually the father); and the surrogate, her husband, 
and the biological father were to execute an Affidavit of 
131. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 283, 923 A.2d at 125; see, e.g., Deems v. W. Md. Ry. 
Co., 247 Md. 95, 102,231 A.2d 514,518 (1967). 
132. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 284, 923 A.2d at 125. 
133. !d. at 285, 923 A.2d at 126. 
134. !d. at 285-86, 923 A.2d at 126 (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 301, 508 A.2d 
964, 969 (1986)). 
135. !d. at 289, 923 A.2d at 129 (citing McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 325, 869 
A.2d 751, 754 (2005)). 
136. !d. at 292, 923 A.2d at 130. 
137. !d. at 292-93, 923 A.2d at 130. The court also noted, "Moreover, there is nothing with 
which to measure the father's ability to be a parent against, in order for a trial court to 
rule that it is not in the best interests of the child to grant the father the relief he 
seeks." !d. at 292, 923 A.2d at 130 (emphasis added). 
138. !d. at 294, 923 A.2d at 131. 
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Parentage indicating that the biological father is the father, 
the surrogate's husband agrees and relinquishes all parental 
rights that he may have, if any, the registrar would report 
that information. The Division would issue a birth 
certificate for the child with the surrogate as the mother and 
the biological father as the father. Or if the surrogate were 
unmarried and she and the biological father executed the 
Affidavit of Parentage, the registrar would report that 
information. The Division would issue a birth certificate for 
the child with the surrogate as the mother and the biological 
father as the father. Then if the biological parent and/or 
surrogate wanted all information regarding the mother 
removed from the birth certificate, the father could institute 
an action in Court to obtain an Order specifYing the 
information to be removed. Such an order may be obtained, 
perhaps, through adoption or a proceeding to determine 
parentage. After receiving such a Court Order, the Division 
would issue a new birth certificate removing the information 
in accordance with the Court's directions. 139 · 
Because of the MDVR's approval of removing the name of the 
surrogate from the birth certificates, the court of appeals ruled that 
the circuit court has the authority to approve and order this action. 140 
D. Analysis of the In re Roberto d.B. Decision and Its Implications 
for Surrogacy in Maryland 
In hindsight, the Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision in In re 
Roberto d.B. did not carry many implications for surrogacy law in 
Maryland, except that gestational surrogacy arrangements will be 
acknowledged by the court if both parties agree. 141 However, the 
court expressly stated that this is a case where the surrogate wanted to 
relinquish her parental rights, not assert them. 142 Therefore, 
Maryland is still left with important questions that have already been 
decided in other states. What happens when the surrogate wants to 
139. !d. at 294-295, 923 A.2d at 131-32 (quoting Letter from James A. Shrybman, 
Attorney, Law Offices of James A. Shrybman, P.C., to Kathryn A. Morris, Birth 
Section Chief, Md. Dep't of Mental Hygiene, Div. of Vital Records (Apr. 21, 2001) 
(on file with author) (emphasis added)). 
140. !d. 
141. See id. at 2 70-71, 923 A.2d at 117. The court also noted that surrogacy contracts for 
the payment of money are illegal under the Maryland baby-selling statutes. !d. at 293, 
923 A.2d at 130. 
142. !d. at 292, 923 A.2d at 130. 
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keep the baby for herself? Under what circumstances, if any, will the 
court enforce these surrogacy contracts? And is there an important 
difference between traditional and gestational surrogacy 
arrangements in making these decisions? 
The court expressly stated in a footnote, responding to Judge 
Cathell's dissent, "[t]his opinion does not create an 'intent' test for 
women." 143 The court specifically noted that it rejected the intent test 
employed in Belsito v. Clark. 144 However, throughout its opinion, the 
court used language that contemplates that it may have factored in the 
intent of the parties in its decision, and that perhaps it would use the 
intent test in a future surrogacy dispute: 
The gestational surrogacy context can involve anonymous 
sperm and egg donors, with the result that the child has no 
genetic relation to the gestational carrier or the intended 
parents; ... [i]t is the appellant's and the appellee's 
contention that the appellee was merely acting as a 
gestational carrier for children that were never intended, by 
either party, to be hers, and to whom she has no genetic 
relationship. . . . As it exists, the paternity statute serves to 
restrict, rather than protect, the relationships the intended 
143. Id. at 284 n.l5, 923 A.2d at 125 n.l5. Judge Cathell expressed concern in his 
dissenting opinion that as a result of the majority's opinion, if a woman does not 
intend to be a mother, she should not be responsible for the child. Id. at 298, 923 
A.2d at 134 (Cathell, J., dissenting). 
I d. 
With the majority's decision today, if a genetic and/or birth 
mother does not intend to act as a mother during this 
manufacturing process-they have no responsibility as a mother. 
Presumably, now both fathers and mothers ... can claim that no 
one should be responsible for the rearing and support of the 
child(ren). 
144. Id. at 274 n.4, 923 A.2d at 119 n.4 (discussing Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 
65 (C. P. 1994)). 
The [Belsito] court resolved the dispute by employing a newly 
formed 'intent' test to determine who the 'mother' should be. 
Because we do not attempt to redefine what a 'mother' is in this 
case, Belsito has little applicability. In any event, we reject its 
rationale for determining who a 'mother' is, that intent is the 
dispositive factor in the parentage determination. 
Id. (discussing Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d at 65) (citation omitted). 
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parents wish to have with children conceived using these 
new processes. 145 
Although the court expressly disavowed adopting the intent test, 146 
the language the court used suggests that it allowed the surrogate's 
name to be removed from the birth certificate because she did not 
intend to be the children's mother. 147 Judge Cathell highlighted this 
point in his dissent, claiming that the majority took the position in its 
opinion that "if you do not intend to be the mother, you should not be 
responsible as a mother." 148 However, Judge Cathell took that 
position further, suggesting that the majority's decision 
hypothetically would allow a man to deny paternity because he did 
not intend to be the father. 149 
What does this mean for the future of surrogacy contracts in 
Maryland? There are a few options. First, a court could use the In re 
Roberto d.B. opinion to enforce a surrogacy contract and allow the 
intended parents to assert their parental rights. One could argue, as 
Judge Cathell points out in the dissent, that the court allowed a 
surrogate to relinquish her parental rights on the implied basis that 
she did not intend to be the children's mother. 150 Alternatively, a 
court could abide by the court of appeals' statement that it did not 
adopt the intent test in In re Roberto d.B., 151 and it could refuse to 
enforce a surrogacy contract and award parental rights to a surrogate. 
Lastly, the Maryland General Assembly could pass a bill, in response 
to Judge Cathell's appeal for legislative guidance, 152 either restricting 
or allowing surrogacy contracts, as was attempted several times after 
the In re Baby M decision was rendered. 153 
The court of appeals' decision seems to encourage surrogacy 
contracts on the one hand, by allowing the surrogate in this case to 
145. !d. at 270, 272-73, 279, 923 A.2d at 117-18, 122 (emphasis added). 
146. !d. at 274 n.4, 923 A.2d at 119 n.4. 
147. !d. at 270, 272-73, 279, 923 A.2d at 117-18, 122 (emphasis added). 
148. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 298, 923 A.2d at 134 (Cathell, J., dissenting). 
149. !d. at 299-300, 923 A.2d at 135 (Cathell, J., dissenting). While Judge Cathell's 
reasoning as to the majority adopting an "intent" test may be correct, the implication 
for paternity challenges is somewhat far-fetched, as the majority's holding could be 
limited to the context of surrogacy arrangements, not extended to natural births. 
150. !d. 
151. !d. at 274 n.4, 923 A.2d at 119 n.4 (majority opinion). 
152. !d. at 295, 923 A.2d at 132 (Cathell, J., dissenting) ("The issues present in this case, 
going as they do to the very heart of a society, are, in my view, a matter for the 
Legislative Branch of government and not initially for the courts."). 
153. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text. 
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remove her name from the children's birth certificates, 154 but it may 
also leave lawyers and future parents confused about whether intent 
will be acknowledged in enforcing surrogacy contracts. Whether the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland renders a clearer decision in the future, 
or the Maryland General Assembly passes legislation, it is imperative 
that something be done to inform the public as to whether surrogacy 
contracts will be enforceable when they are challenged. 
V. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Because of the very personal and sensitive nature of surrogacy 
arrangements, it is extremely important, if not absolutely necessary, 
for the legislature and judiciary to consider all the potential public 
policy implications in making decisions about its legality. There are 
many aspects to consider, particularly, how the children of surrogacy 
arrangements generally fare, 155 the medical and psychological 
concerns for the parties, 156 as well as the various legal contract 
principles. 157 
A. How Do the Children of Surrogacy Arrangements Fare? 
When deciding whether to award custody to an intended parent or a 
surrogate, it is vital to know if children conceived by ART have more 
complications than those who are conceived naturally. 158 One of the 
most difficult problems with determining how the children in 
surrogacy arrangements are doing socially, emotionally, and 
academically is that not much research has been completed on this 
topic, particularly because the large majority of children studied do 
not know that they are "donor babies." 159 Additionally, "most of the 
research is based on parent self-reports and global quantitative 
measures, rather than systematic outside observations or in-depth 
clinical investigations. And none to date have followed children 
from birth all the way to maturity .... " 160 
However, the research that does exist seems to deliver good news 
to intended parents wanting to have children using ART. 161 
154. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 285, 923 A.2d at 126. 
155. See infra Part V.A. 
156. See infra Parts V.B.1-3. 
157. See infra Part V.C. 
158. DIANE EHRENSAFT, MOMMIES, DADDIES, DONORS, SURROGATES: ANSWERING TOUGH 
QUESTIONS AND BUILDING STRONG FAMILIES 223, 225-26 (2005). 
159. Id. at 228. 
160. Id. 
161. See id. 
186 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 38 
According to several studies, children raised in surrogate families, 
sperm-donor families, and egg-donor families were functioning at the 
same level as children in control groups with regard to several 
categories, including the parent-child relationship and different 
measures of development. 162 In fact, donor-insemination children 
were found to be more advanced than other children with respect to 
"intellectual, psychomotor, and language development." 163 Studies 
of egg-donor babies are uncommon; however, the few that exist do 
not record any issues with eating or sleeping and report no evidence 
of behavioral or emotional problems. 164 A study on surrogacy 
discovered no evidence of speech or motor impairment in children 
born after in vitro fertilization (IVF) surrogacy. 165 Other studies have 
found no difference between surrogacy, egg-donor, and natural 
conception children with regard to psychological functioning. 166 
Only one study to date has given "disturbing news about the 
psychological adjustment of children conceived by donor 
insemination." 167 According to a survey of Dutch children, donor-
insemination children exhibited more behavioral problems than 
naturally conceived children. 168 The discrepancy could be potentially 
explained by the small sample size used in the study or the fact that 
the educational level of the fathers in the donor-insemination group 
was lower than that of the naturally conceived group. 169 
Overwhelmingly, the evidence seems to indicate that children 
conceived via ART are not any different from naturally conceived 
children when it comes to academics and behavioral, social, and 
emotional adjustment, except that these children may actually be 
more intelligent because of the quality of the genes from the donor 
egg or sperm. 170 
162. !d. (citing Susan Golombok & Fiona MacCallum, Practitioner Review: Outcomes for 
Parents and Children Following Non-Traditional Conception, 44 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. 
& PSYCHIATRY 300, 305 (2003)). 
163. !d. at 229. Researchers use the "strong genetic load" of the typical donor profile to 
explain this outcome, as the donor is often a student or working professional. !d. 
164. !d. (citing Golombok & MacCallum, supra note 162, at 309). 
165. !d. (citing Paulo Serafini, Outcome and Follow-Up of Children Born After IVF-
Surrogacy, 7 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 23, 26 (2001)). 
166. Golombok & MacCallum, supra note 162 at 305. 
167. EHRENSAFf, supra note 158, at 229. 
168. !d. (citing A. Brewaeys eta!., Donor Insemination: Dutch Parents' Opinions About 
Confidentiality and Donor Anonymity and the Emotional Adjustment of Their 
Children, 12 HUM. REPROD. 1591, 1593-96 (1997)). 
169. Brewaeys eta!., supra note 168, at 1593. 
170. EHRENSAIT, supra note 158, at 229. 
2008] Future Status of Surrogacy Contracts 187 
Anecdotally, Melissa Stem, the famous "Baby M" from In re Baby 
M, 171 spoke briefly about herself in a New Jersey magazine article. 172 
Melissa, now twenty-one-years old, is a junior at George Washington 
University. 173 She is a religion major and a sorority member, and she 
discussed her reaction to reading about In re Baby M in her bioethics 
class. 174 She wants to be a minister and says she is open to having 
children of her own someday. 175 With regard to Melissa's 
relationship with her parents, the Stems, who, despite losing the 
surrogacy argument in court won custody of Melissa, she said, "I 
love my family very much and am very happy to be with them .... 
I'm very happy I ended up with them. I love them, they're my best 
friends in the whole world." 176 When she turned eighteen, Melissa 
initiated the process for Elizabeth Stem to adopt her, which 
terminated Mary Beth Whitehead Gould's parental rights. 177 
All of the research suggests that children born by ART, including 
surrogacy arrangements, fare just as well, if not better, than children 
conceived naturally. 178 While the research is still not complete by 
any means, this evidence could help legislators and judges when 
making determinations about whether to enforce surrogacy contracts. 
The research and anecdotal evidence demonstrates that the child 
carried by a surrogate will grow and develop just as well being raised 
by the intended parents as by being raised by the child's birth or 
biological mother. 179 
B. Medical and Psychological Concerns for All Parties 
In addition to knowing how the children fare developmentally, 
there are other interests that should be considered, including the 
health concerns of the children, and the psychological effects on the 
surrogate and the intended parents. 
1. Health Concerns for the Children 
On January 11, 2008, BBC News reported an extremely disturbing 
story about a couple who married, and then later discovered they 
171. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
172. Jennifer Weiss, Now It's Melissa's Time, N.J. MONTHLY MAG., Mar. 2007, at 70. 
173. !d. at 70, 72. 




178. EHRENSAFT, supra note 158, at 228-29. 
179. !d. 
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were twins separated at birth. 180 While this sounds like something 
out of a soap opera, it provided a platform for people concerned 
about how ART can lead to problematic situations when children do 
not know who their biological parents are. 181 While this case did not 
involve the use of ART, as the children were separated at birth by 
adoption, it has implications for surrogacy. 182 Apparently, the couple 
was unaware that they were related to each other until after getting 
married, and the marriage was annulled immediately by a court. 183 
Children born into surrogacy arrangements, like adopted children, 
may not know where they come from, so similarly tragic situations 
like this could happen if surrogacy contracts are enforced. 184 In In re 
Roberto d. B., the circuit court, in holding that the court did not have 
the power to remove the surrogate mother's name from the birth 
certificate, cited "health" as one of its main reasons. 185 In fact, one of 
the main arguments cited by parties against upholding surrogacy 
contracts is the potential problem that a child may have because he or 
she does not know his or her biological mother, which can be crucial 
to predicting cancer, heart disease, and other medical conditions. 186 
Aside from a child not knowing where he or she carne from, there 
are other medical concerns with using ART to create children. 187 
Recently, a group of scientific reports have been released notifying 
the public of potential developmental or neurological problems in 
babies born using various forms of ART. 188 "These studies have 
concentrated on two specific procedures-IVF, when fertilization 
takes place in a petri dish, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection 
(ICSI), when a single sperm is injected into an egg and then 
implanted in the wornb." 189 These procedures apply to some, but not 
all, surrogacy arrangements, and the reports give people a good basis 
to assess potential risks when deciding whether or not to conceive a 
child using a surrogate. 190 





184. One politician shared with BBC News how this situation highlighted "the wider issue 
of the importance of strengthening the rights of children to know the identities of their 
biological parents." !d. 
185. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 274, 923 A.2d 115, 119 (2007). 
186. See, e.g., id. at 285, 923 A.2d at 126. 




2008] Future Status of Surrogacy Contracts 189 
At the 2003 European Society of Reproductive and Embryology 
meetings, a study of IVF and ICSI babies concluded that, "[o]verall, 
the results are reassuring and lay to rest fears about the health and 
welfare of children conceived through IVF and ICSI." 191 However, 
when it came to physical health, there were greater risks for 
malformations, mostly minor genital defects. 192 A study in Australia 
determined that babies conceived with either IVF or ICSI "were at a 
higher risk for being delivered by cesarean section, had lower birth 
weights, and were more likely to be born before term" than naturally 
conceived infants. 193 A study in Sweden discovered that 2% of 
children born through IVF were treated for neurologically related 
problems, which was double the rate of such problems in the control 
group of babies conceived naturally. 194 
In summary, children conceived using ART may have a higher risk 
of health problems by a very narrow margin. 195 Studies show that the 
risks are extremely small or the diseases extremely rare, and the vast 
majority of these children were normal. 196 Ultimately, courts and 
legislators should realize that, while there are risks that a child 
conceived by ART could be affected medically or emotionally (in the 
future, by, for example, marrying a sibling), these chances are so 
191. !d. (quoting Martin Hutchinson, Public Reassured on IVF Safety, BBC NEWS, July 2, 
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/z/hi/health/3037400.stm). 
192. /d. (citing Hutchinson, supra note 191); see also IVF, ICSI Babies as Healthy as 
Others, WEBMD, July 2, 2003, http://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-
reproduction/news/20030702/ivf-icsi-babies-as-healthy-as-others ("The rate of birth 
defects was 6.2% for ICSI children, 4.1% for ISCI and IVF babies, respectively, 
compared with 2.4% among naturally conceived children."). 
193. EHRENSAFT, supra note 158, at 226 (citing Michele Hansen eta!., The Risk of Major 
Birth Defects After Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection and In Vitro Fertilization, 346 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 725, 725, 727 (2002)). "They were also more than twice as likely 
to have a major birth defect diagnosed by one year of age-in their urinary and genital 
systems, their muscles and bones, their vascular systems, or their chromosomes." /d. 
(citing Hansen et a!., supra, at 725, 727-28). A United States study reported similar 
results. !d. (citing Laura Schieve eta!., Low and Very Low Birth Weight in Infants 
Conceived With Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 731 
(2002)). 
194. !d. at 227 (citing B. Stromberg eta!., Neurological Sequelae in Children Born After 
In-Vitro Fertilization, 359 LANCET 461, 462 (2002)). The study cited a high 
percentage of twins, low birth weights, and preterm births as likely cause for the 
higher incidence of neurological problems. !d. (citing Stromberg eta!., supra, at 463). 
195. !d. at 228. 
196. !d. 
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"infinitesimally small" that the benefits of allowing and enforcing 
surrogacy contracts may outweigh the potential costs. 197 
2. Psychological Concerns for the Surrogate 
In determining which party should be ruled the child's legal parent 
in surrogacy disputes, the courts tend to weigh the competing 
interests of the two parties. 198 Particularly, they examine the 
detrimental psychological effects on the surrogate, who would have 
to give up a child she carried for nine months, against the detrimental 
psychological effects on the intended parents, who would have to 
give up the child they wanted so badly. 199 Although it seems as 
though only, the child's best interests should be considered, it is very 
difficult to make determinations based on possible future events. 
Additionally, unlike normal custody disputes, there are usually not 
many factors for a judge to examine when choosing which parents 
will be the best for the child. 200 
Mary Beth Whitehead, the traditional surrogate who lost custody of 
Melissa Stem in the famous In re Baby M case, wrote a book about 
her experience in having to give up her child. 201 In the beginning of 
Chapter Three, entitled "The Loss," she quotes a doctor's letter to the 
editor in The New York Times that stated: 
Probably the most stressful and anxiety-provoking act in 
human existence is the separation of a woman from her 
newborn infant. The response to this, which humans share 
with most of the animal kingdom, is an overwhelming 
combination of panic, rage, and distress. Who can dare 
judge the psychological acts and responses of a woman put 
to such a test? 202 
After losing Melissa in the custody dispute between herself and the 
Stems, Mrs. Whitehead experienced extreme emotional distress: 
197. See id. 
198. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 786 (Cal. 1993). 
199. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1259 (N.J. 1988). 
200. See, e.g., In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 292, 923 A.2d 115, 132 (2007) 
("Moreover, there is nothing with which to measure the father's ability to be a parent 
against, in order for a trial court to rule that it is not in the best interests of the child to 
grant the father the relief he seeks."). 
201. See generally MARY BETH WHITEHEAD WITH LORETTA SCHWARTZ-NOBEL, A 
MOTHER'S STORY: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE BABY M CASE (1989). 
202. !d. at 17 (quoting D. Ruskin, Letter to the Editor, The Most Stressful Act, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 20, 1987, at A26). 
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As the month of April drew to a close, I realized that the old 
feelings of grief, self-hatred, and worthlessness, which I had 
experienced when I let the Stems take the baby home the 
first time, had returned. There were days when my chest 
ached as if my heart had ruptured inside me. 203 
191 
Many surrogates, particularly in traditional surrogacy 
arrangements, may suffer feelings of loss and post-partum depression 
following pregnancy. 204 Some surrogates are also faced with stress 
caused by criticism for their participation in the surrogacy 
arrangement. 205 Therefore, when awarding custody, particularly in 
traditional surrogacy arrangements, it is important to consider the 
potential for negative psychological effects on the surrogate. 206 
3. Psychological Concerns for the Intended Parents 
Intended parents may also experience detrimental psychological 
effects if they lose the child they worked so hard for and waited so 
long to have. While there is not much research dedicated specifically 
to the psychological effects on intended parents who have lost a child 
this way, there is anecdotal evidence of the "hurt and anguish" that 
couples feel when the surrogate changes her mind. 207 When a 
surrogate wants to keep the baby, the potential litigation "is likely to 
be a lengthy, expensive and painful battle that-at best-awards 
them custody of a child who is sought by his/her birthmother." 208 
There has been a significant amount of research written about the 
psychological effects of infertility in general. 209 One husband wrote 
about his and his wife's challenges of infertility: 
203. Jd.at171-72. 
204. SUSAN LEWIS COOPER & ELLEN SARASOHN GLAZER, CHOOSING ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 286 ( 1998). 
205. /d. 
206. In states where the statutes prohibit compensation for surrogates, a surrogate may be 
less likely to experience negative psychological effects since she may altruistically 
agree to help others such as a friend or family member. FIELD, supra note 17, at 20-
21. It follows that there may be less pressure on the surrogate and a greater chance 
that the surrogate will seek psychological counseling before the process to ensure she 
is prepared to handle the emotional aspect of the experience. 
207. COOPER & GLAZER, supra note 204, at 284. 
208. /d. 
209. See, e.g., Andrew J. Geller, Facing the Challenge of Infertility, AM. SuRROGACY CTR., 
Aug. 29, 2006, http://www.surrogacy.com/articles/news_view.asp?ID=47; JAMES 
MCGUIRK & MARY ELIZABETH MCGUIRK, FOR WANT OF A CHILD: A PSYCHOLOGIST 
AND HIS WIFE EXPLORE THE EMOTIONAL EFFECTS OF INFERTILITY (1991); DEBBY 
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As a result, we may come to know a range of responses 
including, but not limited to, fearfulness, dread, rage, 
sadness, grief, confusion, shame, resentment, and numbness. 
. . . One of the areas of uncertainty that can lead to a 
crazy-making roller coaster ride (during in vitro treatment) 
is wondering whether the end result will be, God forbid, no 
pregnancy at all or, almost as overwhelming, twins or 
triplets! 
. . . Infertility challenges our belief, faith and hope in the 
normal workings of our body, and may leave us feeling 
broken and defective. 210 
Because uncertainty is one of the key factors contributing to the 
detrimental psychological effects on infertile couples, going through 
the incredibly uncertain surrogacy arrangement process can worsen 
those effects. Infertile couples who put a tremendous amount of hope 
into one person to give up her child seem to face the ultimate 
uncertainty, which could lead to serious psychological problems if 
the couple loses the child they intended to raise as their own. As 
Maryland law now stands, this uncertainty in surrogacy contracts acts 
as a disincentive to enter into surrogacy arrangements and also 
increases the likelihood of psychological problems for intended 
parents who do choose to use a surrogate. 
C. Legal Contract Principles211 
According to a 1987 New York Times/CBS News poll, the 
American public supported the decision in In re Baby M, agreeing 
that custody of the child should be awarded to the father instead of 
the surrogate mother. 212 Seventy-four percent of 1045 adults 
interviewed by telephone said that the baby should go to the intended 
father, while only 15% believed that the surrogate mother should get 
custody of the child. 213 Furthermore, when the public was asked 
PEOPLES & HARRIETTE ROVNER FERGUSON, EXPERIENCING INFERTILITY (1999); 
BOBBIE REED, LONGING FOR A CHILD: COPING WITH INFERTILITY (1994 ). 
210. Geller, supra note 209. 
211. This section is only intended to be a broad overview of the basic legal contract 
principles involved in surrogacy contracts. For a more detailed account of this topic, 
see, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood, 38 BUFF. L. 
REv. 515 (1990). 
212. Poll Shows Most in U.S. Back Baby M Ruling, NYT!MES.COM, Apr. 12, 1987, 
http://www.nytimes.com (search for "Poll Shows Most in U.S. Back Baby M 
Ruling"). 
213. !d. 
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about custody issues in general, the support for fathers in such cases 
which involve a signed contract was again very high. 214 Sixty-nine 
percent of the public indicated that a surrogate mother should be 
bound by the signed agreement, and only 19% expressed that the 
surrogate should be free to change her mind. 215 
The public's opinion may reflect a respect for the traditional 
contract elements contained in a surrogacy contract: offer, 
acceptance, and consideration. 216 Even when no payment or 
compensation is allowed by the intended parents to the surrogate, the 
consideration may be found in the giving of sperm, paying medical 
expenses, and promising to adopt the child. 217 Under contract law 
principles, surrogacy agreements should be upheld and enforced. 218 
Therefore, the court should award custody of the child to the intended 
parents according to the terms of the contract. 
However, several contract defenses have been used to hold 
surrogacy contracts unenforceable, the most prominent being in In re 
Baby M, where the contract was held to be void as contrary to public 
policy. 219 A second defense, similar to public policy, is 
unenforceability on the basis of illegality. 220 In states where statutes 
prohibit baby-selling, as in Maryland, surrogacy contracts for 
compensation can be invalidated since the consideration would be 
deemed illegal. 221 Finally, the doctrine of unconscionability has been 
used to declare a surrogacy contract void when the contract 
encouraged the parties to sign away the legal rights of triplets born to 
214. !d. 
215. Id. 
216. See FIELD, supra note 17, at 76; JEFFREY FERRIELL & MICHAEL NAVIN, 
UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 149 (2004) (stating that a contract is formed once there 
is an offer and an acceptance, supported by consideration). 
217. FIELD, supra note 17, at 77. 
218. ld.atl5,76. 
219. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240, 1246-47 (N.J. 1988) ("The surrogacy contract's 
invalidity ... is further underlined when its goals and means are measured against 
New Jersey's public policy .... The surrogacy contract guarantees permanent 
separation of the child from one of its natural parents. Our policy, however, has long 
been that to the extent possible, children should remain with and be brought up by 
both of their natural parents."). 
220. See, e.g., id. at 1234 (holding that payment of money to a surrogate is illegal, and 
possibly criminal, and therefore a surrogacy contract is unenforceable); In re Roberto 
d.B., 399 Md. 267,293, 923 A.2d 115, 130 (2007) (noting that payment of money for 
a child is illegal, and therefore surrogacy contracts are illegal as well). 
221. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW§ 5-362(a) (LexisNexis 2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAw § 3-603 (LexisNexis 2002). 
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the surrogate and failed to provide for a legal mother for the 
children. 222 
Aside from these contract defenses, the law governing contracts 
seems favorable to upholding surrogacy contracts, as all of the 
necessary elements are present. 223 However, several states have 
expressly held that surrogacy contracts are unenforceable, and their 
courts will not allow the intended parents to enforce their rights under 
the contract. 224 However, the question of whether a surrogacy 
contract will be upheld is still open in Maryland because there are no 
statutes expressly prohibiting or allowing surrogacy contracts. 
VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Comment's analysis and recommendations are based upon an 
important distinction between the types of surrogacy arrangements-
traditional and gestational. 225 Three states have statutes which 
distinguish between these two types of arrangements: Florida, New 
Hampshire, and Virginia. 226 All three states have comprehensive 
statutory schemes that provide specific requirements that must be 
followed in a surrogacy arrangement. 227 Additionally, through case 
law, California also distinguishes between traditional and gestational 
surrogacy. 228 
The essential inquiry thus becomes twofold: (1) What type of 
surrogacy arrangement is involved, and (2) what should be the result 
in each type of arrangement if the surrogate wants to rescind the 
contract and keep the child? 
222. J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th I (C.P. 2004). 
223. See discussion supra Part V.C. __ .. ·. . 
224. The ·following jurisdjctions· expr¢ssly prohibit stirrogacy contracts regardless of 
payment: Indiana, Michigan, New York, Arizona, North Dakota, and the District of 
Columbia. See KINDREGAN &McBRJ£N,supranote 9, at 146, 153, 157, 163, 169, 172. 
225. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
226. FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 742.15-.16 (West 2005); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 168-B:l to :32 
(LexisNexis 2001); VA. CODE ANN §§20-156 to 165 (2004). 
227. FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 742.15-.16; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 168-B:l6; VA. CODE ANN 
§§ 20-156 to 165. 
228. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776; 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that when one woman 
is not the biological mother and birthmother, "she who intended to bring about the 
birth of a child that. she intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother"); 
Moschetta v. Moschetta,_30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893-(1994) (distinguishing Johnson because 
that case involved ge~tational surrogacy, while this -case involved a traditional 
surrogacy arrangement). · 
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A. Traditional Surrogacy Arrangements 
Traditional surrogacy arrangements, when the surrogate is both the 
biological mother and the birth mother of the child, are generally 
much more controversial than gestational surrogacy arrangements. 229 
Society, legislators, and courts have a difficult time allowing a 
woman to sign a binding contract relinquishing her rights to her 
biological child before the child is born. 230 Obviously, if the 
surrogate voluntarily gives up the child when it is born, there are not 
usually problems with granting the intended parents custody. 231 The 
problem arises when a traditional surrogate wants to keep the child, 
despite her promises in the contract that she will give the child to the 
intended couple. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision in In re Roberto d.B. 
does not speak to these types of surrogacy arrangements, 232 and 
therefore, there is no way to ascertain how the court would rule if it 
had the opportunity to decide whether a traditional surrogacy contract 
was valid. An examination of Maryland's adoption statutes and 
public policy, as discussed in Part V, is vital to this determination. 
Maryland's adoption laws provide that for an independent 
adoption, consent of a parent is only valid if given after the 
prospective adoptee is born. 233 Also, the consent must contain an 
express notice of "the right to revoke consent, at any time within 30 
days after the consent is signed."234 Since a biological parent is the 
legal and natural parent, under Maryland's adoption laws, a 
traditional surrogate would not be able to give valid consent until the 
baby is born. 235 Thus, if the surrogate decides to rescind the contract 
before she has the baby or within thirty days of having given consent, 
the contract would violate Maryland's adoption laws. 236 Because of 
Maryland's stance against allowing a biological mother to give up her 
child before it is born,237 the Maryland legislature should not allow, 
and the courts should not enforce, traditional surrogacy contracts 
229. See discussion supra Parts II.B.l-3. 
230. See discussion supra Parts II.B.l-4. 
231. Cf discussion supra Parts II.B.l-4 (All of the discussed cases and statutes involve 
surrogates who rescinded their contracts.). 
232. See In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 271, 923 A.2d 115, 117 (2007) (describing In re 
Roberto d.B. 's gestational surrogacy arrangement). 
233. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW§ 5-3B-2l(a)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2006). 
234. !d. § 5-3B-2l(a)(2)(iv)(l). 
235. See id. § 5-3B-21 (a)(2)(i). 
236. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text. 
237. § 5-3B-2l(a)(2)(i). 
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until after the child has been born and the biological mother has given 
valid consent. 
The legislature should create a statutory scheme to this effect, but 
without criminalizing traditional surrogacy contracts. The problem 
that needs to be addressed in legislation is when the surrogate 
changes her mind and wants to keep the baby, not when everything 
goes well and the intended parents are given the child. This may 
seem harsh for the intended parents, because they could enter into an 
agreement without knowing whether the traditional surrogate will 
change her mind, but it is consistent with the current adoption 
laws. 238 Furthermore, the arguably more important policy 
justification-· the negative psychological effects on the surrogate in 
giving up her child without being able to change her mind-is 
satisfied by this outcome. 
There is one remedy for the intended parents in this situation. If 
the traditional surrogate was artificially inseminated with the 
intended father's sperm, then a situation like In re Baby M could 
occur, where the court would decide a custody dispute between the 
surrogate and the biological father. 239 In this "best interests of the 
child" analysis, a court could examine various factors, including the 
existence of a surrogacy contract and the circumstances under which 
it was entered into, possibly leading to the intended parents receiving 
legal and physical custody of the child anyway. 240 The disadvantage 
to this result is the potential for the surrogate to get visitation or 
partial custody, which could be a difficult situation for these two sets 
ofparents. 241 
In In re Baby M, the New Jersey court declined to enforce a 
traditional surrogacy arrangement. In comparison to the increasing 
use of gestational surrogacy, traditional surrogacy arrangements are 
becoming less popular due to technological advances and because the 
nature of the contract runs contrary to public policy. 242 Current 
adoption laws in Maryland reveal a negative view toward allowing 
238. See id. § 5-3B-21. 
239. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234-35 (N.J. 1988). 
240. !d. at 1256, 1259. 
241. !d. at 1261-63. 
242. /d. at 1246-50 (citing several public policies violated by the surrogacy contract 
including the following: that children should be raised by both of their natural parents; 
that rights of natural parents are equal concerning their child, with father's right being 
no greater than mother's; policies governing consent to surrender of the child; policies 
regarding concern for the best interests of the child; and policies against the 
degradation ofwomen). 
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pre-birth consent, 243 and surrogacy laws should follow suit because 
the same policy implications exist. Additionally, because baby-
selling is prohibited in Maryland, 244 there is less of an incentive for 
traditional surrogates to enter into these arrangements unless they are 
acting purely altruistically, which then decreases the chance they will 
renege on the deal. There should be a disincentive to entering into 
traditional surrogacy arrangements because of the unpredictability of 
what the surrogate will do and the inability to give consent before the 
child is born. 
Therefore, in traditional surrogacy cases, if a surrogate chooses to 
rescind the contract and keep her baby, the court should not uphold 
the contract because it is against public policy and violates the 
adoption statutes already in place. If the intended father's sperm was 
used to conceive the child, the court should use the "best interests of 
the child" standard to determine custody. 245 Finally, if a traditional 
surrogate abides by the contract and gives up the child, she and the 
intended parents should follow standard adoption procedures, the 
MDVR should allow the birth certificate to be amended, and the 
court should recognize this decision. 
B. Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements 
Gestational surrogacy contracts are distinguishable from traditional 
surrogacy contracts246 and, therefore, should be treated differently by 
the courts and legislature in Maryland. There is no need to provide a 
disincentive for entering into gestational surrogacy contracts, because 
in these arrangements, a surrogate is merely acting as a carrier for the 
child and is not genetically related to it. 247 Since parentage is almost 
always determined through biological ties (barring exceptional 
circumstances), 248 a gestational surrogate does not have the requisite 
standing to argue that she is the legal mother. 
In order to maintain consistency in gestational surrogacy law, it is 
important to follow basic contract principles. As long as the 
surrogate and intended parents entered into a valid contract, the 
contract should be upheld, and the surrogate should not be allowed to 
243. See § 5-38-21 (a)(2)(i). 
244. See id. § 5-38-32. 
245. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1256 (N.J. 1988). 
246. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 270, 923 A.2d 115, 117 (2007). 
247. !d. at 270, 923 A.2d at 117. 
248. See In reAdoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 561, 640 A.2d 1085, 
1096 (1994). 
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revoke her promise. This is especially true since compensation is not 
allowed, and there are no arguments for the contract being void as 
against public policy or because it is unconscionable. There is no 
real potential for coercion of the surrogate because she cannot be 
compensated. 
Additionally, because the research done on children born through 
surrogate arrangements concludes that these children do not fare any 
worse than children conceived naturally/49 there is no reason to 
invalidate these contracts. Infertility is a significant problem and 
couples attempting to have children using ART should not be faced 
with even more unpredictability and inconsistency, which could have 
adverse psychological effects on them. 250 While there are potential 
adverse effects on gestational surrogates because they are giving up a 
child they carried for nine months, it is not as severe as the impact on 
traditional surrogates because the child carried by the gestational 
surrogate is not biologically related.251 
While the court in In re Roberto d.B. expressly denied adopting any 
sort of "intent" test, 252 its language suggests an implicit adoption of 
such a tese53 as in Belsito v. Clar/?54 and Johnson v. Calvert. 255 
Therefore, in a disputed gestational surrogacy case, a court should 
look at the intent of the parties and uphold the contract. 
Instead of waiting until the court of appeals hears a case involving 
surrogacy again, it would be helpful to couples, surrogates, and their 
lawyers for the General Assembly to pass legislation that not only 
expressly allows gestational surrogacy contracts, but also provides a 
means and method of what is required to enter into a surrogacy 
contract and how they can get a court to enter an order of parentage 
in favor of the intended parents. Virginia has a comprehensive and 
thorough statutory scheme that could serve as a model for Maryland 
legislators. 256 
249. See supra Part V.A; see also European Society for Human Reproduction & 
Embryology, Families with Children Without a Genetic or Gestational Link to Their 
Parents Are Functioning Well, EUREKALERT!, July 5, 2008, 
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2008-07/esfh-fwc070208.php. 
250. COOPER & GLAZER, supra note 204, at 284. 
251. Cf id. at 288. 
252. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 284 n.l5, 923 A.2d at 125 n.15. 
253. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
254. Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 65 (C.P. 1994). 
255. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
256. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159 (2004). 
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In Virginia, it is legal for a surrogate, her husband, and the intended 
parents to enter into a surrogacy arrangement. 257 Before a surrogate 
is impregnated, the parties must request to have their surrogacy 
arrangement judicially approved. 258 The parties can thus be certain 
that the court approves of the arrangement and their intentions before 
they begin any procedures, which provides security to the parties. 
Virginia law is explicit in its requirements for the surrogacy 
contract. 259 The intended parents, the surrogate, and the surrogate's 
husband (if any) must sign and have the surrogacy contract 
acknowledged. 260 Then, they must join in filing a petition to the 
circuit court in a county or city where at least one of them resides, 
with their contract attached. 261 Before a hearing on the petition, the 
court appoints a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of any 
potential child(ren), appoints an attorney to represent the surrogate, 
and orders a home study of all parties-the surrogate, the surrogate's 
husband, and the intended parents. 262 The court retains exclusive and 
continuing jurisdiction over all matters "arising under the surrogacy 
contract until all provisions of the contract are fulfilled." 263 The 
exclusive and continuing jurisdiction requirement is helpful because 
the parties will be dealing with the same court, which provides 
consistency and predictability. At the hearing on the petition, the 
court will enter an order approving the contract and authorizing the 
surrogacy arrangement for twelve months from the issuance. 264 After 
the parties have met certain requirements, the court will discharge the 
guardian ad litem and the surrogate's attomey. 265 Within seven days 
257. /d. § 20-l59(A). 
258. /d. §§ 20-l59(B), 20-160(B). 
259. KlNDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 9, at 176. 
260. § 20-l60(A). 
261. /d. 
262. /d. § 20-l60(A), (B)2. 
263. /d. § 20-l60(A). 
264. /d. § 20-l60(B). 
265. /d. The conditions required to discharge the guardian ad litem and surrogate's 
attorney are as follows: 
(l) the court has jurisdiction; (2) a home study of the intended 
parents, the surrogate, and the husband has been filed with the 
court; (3) the parties meet the standards of fitness applied to 
adoptive parents; (4) all parties have voluntarily entered into the 
contract and understand its meaning, provisions, and effect, and 
understand there can be no compensation involved; (5) the 
agreement addresses the payment of medical and ancillary costs 
associated with the pregnancy; (6) the surrogate is married and 
has had at least one pregnancy with a live birth, and there is no 
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of the resulting child's birth, the intended parents must submit written 
notice with the court that the baby was born to the surrogate within 
300 days after the last performance of assisted conception. 266 The 
court will enter an order directing the State Registrar of Vital Records 
to issue a new birth certificate for the child naming the intended 
parents as the parents of the child, upon a finding that at least one of 
the intended parents is the genetic parent of the child. 267 Although 
these statutory requirements may seem stringent, they are the best 
way to ensure that a surrogacy contract will be enforced. 
The only necessary addition for these statutes to be complete is a 
provision covering gestational surrogacy arrangements where neither 
of the intended parents is biologically related to the child. For 
instance, if both of the intended parents are infertile, and they use 
donor sperm and eggs, which are implanted into the surrogate, the 
intended parents should be allowed to enforce this contract based on 
contract principles and the intent test. Generally, people who 
voluntarily donate sperm and eggs have no rights and no 
responsibilities as parents once they have donated the reproductive 
material. 268 
Therefore, notwithstanding that neither of the parents is genetically 
related to the child, gestational surrogacy contracts should be upheld 
in Maryland even if the surrogate wants to rescind the contract, 
because of public policy implications, the In re Roberto d. B. decision, 
and current statutes in force. Additionally, a legislative scheme 
similar to the one in Virginia should be implemented to ensure the 
greatest predictability and consistency for the intended parents and 
the surrogate who enter into gestational surrogacy contracts, namely 
for the protection of the party who stands to lose the most-the 
intended parents. 
risk to her health in bearing another child; (7) the parties and the 
court have seen reports of the physical examinations and 
psychological evaluations; (8) the intended mother is infertile; (9) 
at least one of the intended parents is a gamete provider; ( 1 0) the 
husband of the surrogate is a part to the surrogacy agreement; (11) 
the parties have received counseling regarding the effects of 
surrogacy; and (12) the agreement would not be substantially 
detrimental to anyone's interests. 
KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 9, at 177-78. 
266. § 20-160(0). 
267. /d. 
268. CooPER & GLAZER, supra note 204, at 175 ("The donor needs to know that he will not 
be required to provide any means of care or support for the child, and the parents need 
to know they will be protected from any claims on their child, legal or otherwise, from 
the donor."). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
While In re Roberto d.B. may be a "landmark" case in Maryland 
because it was the first time the court of appeals decided a case 
dealing with surrogacy, it was clearly not enough to answer the many 
questions of lawyers and future parents. Many other states have gone 
much further than Maryland in their development of this area of the 
law, through appellate decisions and statutes. 269 Judge Cathell was 
correct in stating that the General Assembly must give the courts and 
practitioners guidance on this topic, 270 because there are many public 
policy implications involved with ART in general and surrogacy in 
particular. 
While general contract law principles may allow surrogacy 
contracts to be upheld, public policy and current Maryland adoption 
law distinguish between traditional and gestational surrogacy 
arrangements. 271 Traditional surrogacy arrangements should not be 
enforced if the surrogate changes her mind, because there are too 
many adverse psychological effects on the surrogate if she has to give 
up her biological child before it is born. Maryland's adoption statutes 
do not allow pre-birth consent; this is a strong indicator that the 
Maryland legislature views the relationship between a mother and her 
biological child very seriously and would not allow a surrogate's 
parental rights to be relinquished so easily. 272 Gestational surrogacy 
arrangements, however, create a different set of rights for the parties, 
particularly when the intended parents are biologically related to the 
child, but also when there are donated sperm and eggs. In this 
situation, the gestational surrogate is merely a mode of transport for 
the baby growing inside her, and thus, the surrogate should not have 
any rights to the baby because there is a presumption in favor of 
biological parenthood in Maryland. 273 The public policy 
considerations also weigh strongly in favor of the intended parents, 
since the loss of a child they worked so hard to conceive could be 
formidable to their psyches. 
Finally, the Maryland General Assembly should adopt a statutory 
scheme, such as that of Virginia, which embraces gestational 
surrogacy and gives protection to the intended parents as well as the 
269. See supra Part II.B. 
270. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 300, 923 A.2d 115, 135 (2007) (Cathell, J., 
dissenting). 
271. See supra Part VI. 
272. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text. 
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surrogate. 274 It is imperative to provide consistent laws so attorneys 
will be able to advise their clients on one of the most important 
decisions in their lives, the decision to bring a child into the world. 
Ashley E. Bashur 
274. See supra notes 256-67 and accompanying text. 
